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NOTES 
TAX TREATMENT OF PREVIOUSLY EXPENSED AS-
SETS IN CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS 
Internal Revenue Code section 3361 requires nonrecognition of 
any gain on property distributed in liquidation. But where a liqui-
dating corporation distributes in kind to its shareholders assets for 
which it took a business expense deduction2 from a prior year's taxa-
ble income,3 allowing the corporation to retain the benefit of the pre-
I. I.R.C. § 336 provides: 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 
453B (relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation. 
(b) LIFO Inventory.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-If a corporation inventorying goods under the LIFO method distrib-
utes inventory assets in partial or complete liquidation, then the LIFO reca~ture amount 
with respect to such assets shall be treated as gain to the corporation recogmzed from the 
sale of such inventory assets. 
(2) EXCEPTION WHERE BASIS DETERMINED UNDER SECTION 334(b)(l).-Paragraph (I) 
shall not apply to any liquidation under section 332 for which the basis of property re-
ceived is determined under section 334(b )(1 ). 
(3) LIFO RECAPTURE AM0UNT.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "LIFO recap-
ture amount" means the amount (if any) by which-
(A) the inventory amount of the inventory assets under the first-in, first-out method 
authorized by section 471, exceeds 
{B) the inventory amount of such assets under the LIFO method. 
(4) DEFINITI0Ns.-For purposes of this subsection -
(A) LIFO METH0D.-The term "LIFO method" means the method authorized by sec-
tion 472 (relating to last-in, first-out inventories). 
(B) OTHER DEFINITIONS.-The term "inventory assets" has the meaning given to such 
term by subparagraph (A) of section 3ll(b)(2), and the term "inventory amount" has the 
meaning given to such term by subparagraph (B) of section 3ll(b)(2) (as modified by 
paragraph (3) of section 3ll(b)). 
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162 (trade or business expenses) and 212 (expenses for production of 
income). These provisions ensure that tax is levied on net income. 
3. Liquidating distributions of previously expensed assets in kind may seem to be rare, but 
the problem is not without practical importance. The Internal Revenue Service reports 15 
current cases pending involving potential tax liability of $ l. 7 million. Petitioner's Brief for 
Certiorari at 4, United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., No. 81-930 (U.S. 1981 Term). Further, the 
resolution of cases involving distributions in kind may carry over to the presumably more 
co=on situation involving distribution of the proceeds of sale of such property. See note 14 
infra. 
There are several situations in which assets existing at the time of liquidation may have 
been properly expensed in a previous tax year. I.R.C. § 162 allows the deduction of "all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any 
trade or business." Although "[t]he expense deduction as permitted by regulation is intended 
to reflect the cost of [items] actually consumed during the taxable year," Spitalny v. United 
States, 430 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original), the Service allows, under some 
circumstances, the full cost of assets not completely consumed in the taxable year to be de-
ducted. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55 (allowing "expensing" of business property 
with an average useful life ofless than one year); Treas. Reg. § l.162-3 (1958) (allowing de-
duction of the total cost of supplies and materials for which no records of c'Qnsumption or 
inventories are kept, so long as "taxable income is clearly reflected by this method."); Treas. 
1636 
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vious deduction without recognizing a gain on the unconsumed 
expensed assets appears to constitute a windfall.4 Although the de-
ductions represented actual cost at the time, and the corporation re-
tains only valueless retired stock after the distribution, the mere 
survival of expensed assets at liquidation arguably constitutes cur-
rent gain that should be subject to taxation at the corporate rate. 
The courts5 and commentators6 have disagreed about the appropri-
ate corporate tax in this situation, and the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in Bliss .Dairy, Inc. v. United States7 to settle the 
dispute. 
Reg.§ l.446-l(a)(4)(ii), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 218 (requiring capitalization only of assets with 
a life extending substantially beyond the tax year). 
In addition, I.R.C. § 179 allows expense treatment ofup to $5000 (increasing to $7,500 for 
taxable years beginning in 1984 or 1985, and to $10,000 thereafter) in aggregate value of depre-
ciable business assets placed in service in the year of the deduction. This amount is explicitly 
recaptured upon disposition of the assets under I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2). See note 126 infra. 
4. The apparent windfall results from the taxpayer's receipt of two benefits from the 
purchase price of the assets: (a) the tax deduction and (b) the assets themselves. The Code, by 
allowing deductions for expenses but not for capital investment, is intended to make these two 
benefits mutually exclusive. That is, if the assets are consumed during the tax year, expense 
treatment is permitted. I.R.C. § 162. But if the assets have a useful life extending beyond the 
tax year, their cost would ordinarily be a nondeductible capital investment. I.R.C. § 263. The 
expense treatment allowed under Rev. Rul. 59-249 and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3, supra note 3, 
allows the possibility of the double benefit, producing a windfall to the corporation equal to 
the value of the assets. 
5. Compare Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), qffd, 
582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that the value of previ-
ously expensed assets held at the time of distribution is includable in ordinary income of the 
corporation) with Commisioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963) 
(holding that I.R.C. § 336 extends nonrecognition to distributions in kind of previously ex-
pensed property). The Seventh Circuit has accepted the reasoning in Tennessee-Carolina in 
Hillsboro Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981) and First Trust and Sav. 
Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its 
ruling in South Lake Farms in Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1250 (1982). 
6. See, e.g., Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1978); Bo-
novitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment Under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 57, 71 (1976); Broenen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Sections 332, 
334(b)(2) and 336, 53 TAXES 231 (1975); Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate 
Liquidations and Contributions to Capital· Recent .Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215 
(1980); Epstein, The Tax Benefit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6 TAX ADVISER 454 (1975); 
Forte, Corporate Liquidations - Sections 336 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code - Parity 
Between a .Direct Sale of Assets and a Stock Purchase -Another Laok at Tennessee-Carolina 
and R. M. Smith, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 199 (1980); Gutkin & Beck, Section 337: IRS wrong 
in taxing, at time of liquidation, items previously deducted, 17 J. TAX. 146 (1962); Morrison, 
Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 TAXES 902 
(1976); O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax 
Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215 (1972); 
Reveley & Pratt, Tax Benefit Rule: What Constitutes a Recovery? Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
.Disagree, 57 TAXES 416 (1979); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and Corporate Liquidations: Bait-
ing the "Trap for the Unwary", 4 J. CoRP. L. 681 (1979); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of 
Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure far the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 
995 (1968); Note, The Tax Benefit, Recoveries, and Sales of Property Under Section 337, 9 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 476 (1967). 
7. 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982). 
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The leading case in this area is Tennessee-Carolina Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Commissioner.8 The majority of the Sixth Circuit panel 
hearing the case affirmed the holding of a closely divided Tax Court 
that a subsidiary corporation which distributed previously expensed 
truck tires and tubes to its parent corporation upon liquidation was 
liable for tax on their fair market value. The holding was based on 
the tax benefit rule, a judicially created doctrine now codified in sec-
tion 111 which allows taxation of "recoveries" of amounts previously 
deducted to the extent that the deductions resulted in a tax benefit.9 
The court avoided the threshold question of whether there was a "re-
covery" by relying on a dictum in Estate of Block10 stating that 
"[w]hen recovery or some other event which is inconsistent with what 
has been done in the past occurs, adjustments must be made in re-
porting income for the year in which the change occurs." 11 The 
court found two facts inconsistent with the prior expense treatment 
of the tires and tubes: (a) the survival of the assets upon liquidation 
despite their treatment as an expense, and (b) the step-up, or in-
crease, in their basis value in the hands of the transferee, to fair mar-
ket value.12 
The court also compared the case to those arising under Code 
section 337,13 which was designed to remove arbitrary distinctions 
'between distributions of assets in liquidation and the sale of the as-
sets and distribution of the proceeds. 14 To preserve consistency with 
8. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), qffd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). 
9. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 111; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); I J. MERTENS, 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.34 (Supp. 1981). Note that the Treasury broadens 
the scope of section 111 well beyond the limited number of cases enumerated in the statute. 
Treas. Reg. §1.111-l(a)(l) (1956). 
10. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), qffd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 
(7th Cir. 1940). 
II. 39 B.T.A. at 341 (emphasis added). 
12. 582 F.2d at 382. A step-up in basis to fair market value is equivalent to the treatment 
that the Code would apply in the event of a purchase at that price. See I.R.C. § 1012. Thus 
the transaction is treated like a sale. In fact, the step-up is not necessarily to fair market value. 
See note 61 i'!fra. 
13. 582 F.2d at 383. I.R.C. § 337(a) provides: 
GENERAL RuLE.-If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a cor-
poration adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are 
distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or 
loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property 
within such 12 month period. 
14. I.R.C § 337 provides that, with certain exceptions, the corporation will not recognize 
gain on property sold within one year of a liquidating distribution of the proceeds of the sales 
to the shareholders. This section was intended to eliminate the trap for the unwary created by 
the decisions in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) and United States v. 
Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d 
Sess. 259 (1954). In Court Holding, the Court held that the proceeds of a sale by the share-
holder of assets received in liquidation were not eligible for § 336 nonrecognition because the 
sale, having been initiated by the shareholder in his capacity as a corporate officer was, in 
effect, a pre-liquidation sale by the corporation. In Cumberland Public Service, the Court held 
that a sale arranged prior to liquidation by an officer/shareholder to take place after liquida-
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established precedent applying the tax benefit rule in section 337 
cases, 15 the court ruled that the Tennessee-Carolina result should be 
sustained.16 
The dissenters in Tennessee-Carolina argued that the majority 
had misapplied the tax benefit rule. Judge Tannenwald of the Tax 
Court argued that before the tax benefit rule applies, there must be 
an actual recovery that would be treated as income in the absence of 
the limitation allowed by the rule.17 According to the Tax Court 
dissenters, the corporation recovered nothing; only the shareholders 
gained anything by the liquidating distribution of previously ex-
pensed assets. The dissenters did not find that the corporation had 
benefited from any taxable "recovery" as a result of the continued 
existence of the tubes and tires or the end of the need to consume 
them. 18 The dissenters saw no reason to override the nonrecognition 
provided by section 336, and distinguished the section 337 cases by 
noting that there clearly is a recovery in that context, 19 and that even 
on the face of the statute, sections 336 and 337 were not designed to 
remove all differences in tax consequences between distributions in 
kind and of proceeds.20 
tion was within § 336 if the officer acted in his personal, rather than corporate capacity. Sec-
tion 337 eliminates the need to draw this fine distinction. 
15. See, e.g., Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. 
Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); Anders v. United States, 
462 F.2d 1147 (Cl Cl. 1972); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). 
16. See 582 F.2d at 383. 
17. See 65 T.C. at 450 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that I.R.C. 
§ 111 requires "receipt of amounts in respect of the previously deducted or credited section 111 
items." Treas. Reg. § 1.lll-l(a)(2) (1956). But note that Treas. Reg.§ 1.lll-l(a)(2) does not 
require a "receipt" of an amount in all cases, since cancellation of taxes is specifically enumer-
ated as a form of "recovery." In Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975) 
Tannenwald, J., concurring, defined the prerequisites for invoking the tax benefit rule as "(1) 
[a]n amount previously deducted, (2) which resulted in a tax benefit, and (3) was recovered 
during the taxable year in issue." The dissent refused to view the continued existence of assets 
that were presumed to be consumed as a recovery of those assets or the "receipt" of any 
amount. 
18. 582 F.2d at 384. For a discussion of the "end of need" argument, see notes 115-18 
infra, and accompanying text. 
19. Section 337 addresses the sale of corporate assets in liquidation rather than the distri-
bution of assets in kind. The corporation clearly recovers, since it receives cash for the assets. 
65 T.C. at 452 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); 582 F.2d 387 (Weick, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Note, however that the majority both in the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals would 
have found this fact irrelevant, since it found a constructive "recovery" merely by the contin-
ued existence of expensed assets at the time of liquidation. 65 T.C. at 448; 582 F.2d at 382. 
20. 65 T.C. at 453 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); 582 F.2d at 387 (Weick, J., concurring and 
dissenting). The Tax Court dissent specifically notes the inconsistencies in the tax treatment 
enumerated in B. Bl'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS (4th ed. 1979). These include: (a) sale of inventory or stock in trade; (b) 
transactions not treated as sales or exchanges; (c) assignment of income, see Commissioner v. 
Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); (d) transactions subject to recapture under§§ 1245 
and 1250; and (e) costs of sale. Exceptions (c) and (d) also apply to § 336; (b) is not an issue 
for distributions. The exceptions for stock in trade and cost of arranging for disposition do 
represent inconsistencies between the treatment of dispositions and sale. Bittker and Eustice 
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This Note argues that although the Tennessee-Carolina majority 
adopts overbroad language and ignores established tax principles,21 
a more careful refinement of its theory will yield the same proper 
result, without, in most situations, departing from accepted princi-
ples. The proper inquiry must focus first on whether the corporation 
has received any benefit, and then on whether that gain should be 
exempted by the nonrecognition provisions of section 336, or on any 
other basis. Part I of this Note examines these questions from a the-
oretical perspective, and concludes that expensed assets remaining at 
the time of liquidation give rise to corporate income, and that 
neither their distribution nor the liquidation of the corporation serve 
point out that the exception is necessary w;ider § 337 to distinguish between sale in the ordi-
nary course of business and winding up activities. There is no reason to doubt that the distri-
bution of assets is a winding up activity, at least of the corporation, if not of the enterprise in a 
more general sense. 
21. In particular, the inconsistent event test seems to imply no stopping point short of a 
complete rejection of the annual accounting principle, which provides that income taxes are to 
be assessed on the basis of receipts and costs during the tax year. See, e.g., Burnet v. Sanford 
& Brooks, 282 U.S. 359, 354 (1931): 
The excess of gross income over deductions did not any the less constitute net income for 
the taxable period because respondent, in an earlier period, suffered net losses in the con-
duct of its business which were in some measure attributable to expenditures made to 
produce the net income of the latter period. 
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), did not overrule Saeford & Brooks, and did 
not endorse the transactional (rather than annual) method of computing rejected in that case. 
Instead, .Dobson held only that events in prior years could be examined to determine whether 
present receipts constitute gain or merely recovery of capital. 320 U.S. at 506-07. The Code 
mitigates the effect of the annual accounting principle through the use of several provisions, 
including I.R.C. § 172 (allowing net operating loss carryovers),§ 111 (the statutory tax benefit 
rule), and§ 1341 (allowing transactional approach where the taxpayer restores an amount held 
under a ctaim•of right). The tax benefit rule is not simply a matter of correcting earlier mis-
takes. For example, it does not eliminate the statute of limitations. I.R.C. § 6501. In recogniz-
ing the tax benefit rule, the .Dobson Court clearly did not intend to override the statute of 
limitations (as that case would have required): 
The Tax Court has not attempted to revise liability for earlier years closed by the statute 
of limitations, nor used any expense, liability, or deficit of a prior year to reduce the 
income of a subsequent year. It went to prior years only to determine the nature of the 
recovery, whether return of capital or income. 
320 U.S. at 493. 
Further evidence that the intent is not to reopen previous returns is provided by the fact 
that rather than adding the recovery to the taxable income for the year of the deduction (where 
the statute of limitations has not run) and computing the additional tax liability at the prior 
marginal tax rate, the recovery is added to current income and taxed accordingly. The former 
approach was taken in Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958), but later aban-
doned by the Court of Claims in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 
(Ct. Cl. 1967). No other court has adopted this approach. 
I.R.C. § 111 operates in essentially the same manner as the judicial rule in .Dobson. Given 
the "recovery" of an amount, the effect of§ 111 is to treat the recovery as either repayment of 
an earlier cost (not taxable) or taxable gain depending on whether earlier income has already 
been treated (with a corresponding tax benefit) as repayment of the cost in question. Beyond 
this limited circumstance, the annual accounting principle is left intact. 
The inconsistent event test, on the other hand, takes a transactional view of tax liability. 
The transactional view, although appealing to some commentators, see, e.g., Note, 21 VAND. 
L. REv. 995, supra note 6, raises practical problems that annual accounting avoids. See, e.g., 
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 6 (inconsistent event test may be too "imperial" but is in the 
right direction). 
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to dissipate the gain before it is realized. Nonrecognition treatment 
should not, as a matter of either rational tax policy or congressional 
intent, be extended to previously expensed assets. 
Part II focuses on the language of the Code, and offers a con-
struction of section 336 which limits its scope to gains or losses 
caused by changes in the value of the assets; under this interpreta-
tion, the tax benefit conferred by the original deduction of the assets' 
cost would be recognized as income, realized but not engendered by 
the liquidation. The available evidence of congressional intent fully 
supports this interpretation, and may independently justify the result 
defended by this Note. Finally, even if section 336 unequivocally 
bars recognition of the gain resulting from distribution of previously 
expensed assets, its application to previously expensed assets impli-
cates the policies of section 111, the statutory tax benefit rule. The 
conflict between these sections should be resolved in favor of section 
111, because denying nonrecognition to previously expensed assets 
does not contravene the policy purposes of section 336. Given that 
reasonable interpretations of the Code are consistent with the princi-
ples of rational tax policy articulated in Part I, the Note concludes 
that the courts should apply the tax benefit rule to previously ex-
pensed assets distributed in liquidation. 
I. THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR RECOGNITION OF GAIN 
The theoretical argument favoring recognition of gain on the dis-
tribution of previously expensed assets relies on three subsidiary 
claims: (a) the corporation is theoretically enriched by the survival 
of previously expensed assets given that it premised an-expense de-
duction on their consumption; (b) the necessity of distributing the 
assets to the shareholders in return for stock that will be valueless 
because of liquidation does not dissipate the gain to the corporation; 
and (c) the congressional policies reflected in nonrecognition provi-
sions in general, and section 336 in particular, reveal no intention to 
exclude the type of gain that results from the survival of previously 
expensed assets. 
A. Corporate Gain 
A frequently cited22 general definition of income is the Haig-
Simons definition: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic 
sum of (I) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and 
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the 
beginning and end of the period in question."23 While this rule is 
22. See, e.g., w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 212 (2d ed. 1979). 
23. ff. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
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too broad to serve as a practical basis for income taxation,24 the con-
cept is useful in that when a taxpayer has received income under the 
Haig-Simons definition, a decision not to tax should be justified by 
practical or tax preference concerns rather than theoretical 
grounds.25 Although deducting the cost of assets that are not con-
sumed increases the "store of property rights," the tax system ignores 
this increase, largely for reasons of administrative convenience.26 
This view of corporate enrichment resembles that advanced by Jus-
tice Holmes in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 27 to reach income 
arising out of a discharge of indebtedness. In that case, the taxpayer 
received the proceeds of a loan and incurred a corresponding debt 
in one year, for which no tax liability arose because the two were 
offsetting. In a later year, when the debt was discharged, the gain 
represented by the receipt of the loan proceeds became taxable.28 In 
the case of previously expensed assets, the taxpayer has paid for the 
assets and treated the payment as a reduction in wealth (f.e., as a 
deduction from income). Since the tax system permits the deduction 
for the purpose of limiting taxation to net income, this accession to 
wealth is not recognized, because an offsetting "liability" arises from 
24. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Summary and Explanation of .Discussion .Draft of Pro• 
posed Regulations on Fringe Benefits (September 5, 1975), (1975] P-H FED. TAXES~ 65,667, 
quoted in W. ANDREWS, supra note 22, at 35; Coven, The .Decline and Fall of Taxable Income, 
79 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (1981). 
25. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, supra note 24, ~ 65,667 (''theoretical definitions of income have 
not been used for the practical purpose of assessing taxes, except as a frame of reference 
against which to judge the existing system."). 
26. To illustrate that the "store of property rights" has been increased, consider two tax-
payers identical in every respect except that one purchases $1000 worth of supplies subject to 
expense treatment and the other buys $2000 worth. If both consume $1000 worth of the sup-
plies during the year, the first taxpayer will retain an additional $1000 in earnings, on which he 
will pay tax of about $500, whereas the second taxpayer retains $1000 worth of supplies on 
which he pays no tax. 
If assets were expensed only when actually consumed, there would be no accumulation of 
previously expensed assets. The rules that permit expensing of certain items before they are 
actually consumed, see note 3 supra, are motivated by administrative convenience. See Spi-
talny v. United States, 430 F.2d at 197 (The "regulation is intended ... to accomplish over a 
period of years roughly the same result as would have been had through use of the inventory 
method, but by a simpler form of accounting."). 
Other examples of income under the Haig-Simons definition that are not taxed for reasons 
of administrative convenience include most forms of imputed income, see, e.g., W. ANDREWS, 
supra note 22, at 58-61, increases or decreases in the value of holdings of property that are 
neither bought nor sold during the tax year, and certain types of fringe benefits that are given 
in kind. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 119. 
27. 284 U.S. I, 3 (1931) ("As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets 
previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct."). 
28. The time of discharge of the debt is the appropriate time of realization. See notes 30-
31 i'!fra and accompanying text. Deferral is provided for the recipient of this "paper" gain 
who-may not have the cash to pay the tax by allowing him to offset the tax liability against 
favorable tax attributes such as basis of depreciable property. See notes 69-70 i'!fra. Note that 
the key to this argument is the untaxed benefit at the time of the loan. Thus there is no gain 
upon the discharge of interest, rather than principal. See Hartland Associates v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 1580, 1586 (1970). 
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the need to consume the assets for business purposes. But when the 
taxpayer later fails to use the assets for business purposes, the acces-
sion to wealth reflected by the assets, which went untaxed because of 
the ded~ction, should be taxed.29 
Although the Haig-Simons definition recognizes increases in the 
total value of an individual's stock of goods as income, the tax sys-
tem generally recognizes changes in wealth only when the gain is 
"realized" by the taxpayer through a transfer, sale, or exchange.30 
The purpose of the doctrine of realization is to delay the imposition 
of tax until a convenient and equitable time, and not to permanently 
bar taxation.31 The doctrine avoids the administrative burdens and 
valuation problems inherent in attempting to measure yearly 
changes in the worth of each taxpayer's holdings32 as well as the 
harshness that might result if cash-poor taxpayers were forced to liq-
uidate appreciated assets merely to pay the tax on the appreciation.33 
Neither rationale for the doctrine would deny that liquidation is an 
appropriate time to realize previously unrealized gains.34 
B. Amount Realized 
Given that accumulated expensed assets of the corporation reflect 
unrealized gain, it is important to ascertain whether the gain is dissi-
pated before the event of realization (ie., liquidation). At least two 
29. The accession to wealth is the amount of the deduction not- offset by actual business 
consumption of the expensed assets. Thus, the surviving assets measure the amount of the 
deduction that is income. See note 81 il!fra. 
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) 
(defining income as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized and over which taxpayers have com-
plete dominion" (emphasis added)); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (the classic for-
mulation of the doctrine of realization). 
3 I. See w. ANDREWS, Sllpra note 22, at 205 n.6; M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
TION ~ 5.01, at 71 (3d ed. 1982). Note that deferral may tum into exemption if appreciated 
property is held until death or transferred to a charitable organization or low bracket taxpayer. 
W. ANDREWS, Sllpra note 22, at 205 n.6. 
32. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, Sllpra note 31, ~ 5.01, at 71. 
33. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 213. 
34. The requirement that a gain be "realized" before it is taxable grows out of two con-
cerns, neither of which is ordinarily compelling once the corporation liquidates. The first con-
cern is administrative: It is inconvenient, particularly in view of valuation difficulties, to 
measure and tax all of the "paper'' gains and losses of the taxpayer when transactions are 
incomplete in the sense that the same gains and losses may have to be reevaluated in suc-
ceeding years. See note 32 Sllpra and accompanying text. Since liquidation is a one-time 
event, administrative convenience is no longer served by delaying valuation, except in the 
situation where the investment in the assets is viewed as continuing investment by a single 
taxpayer, with liquidation resulting in a change in form only. These circumstances are ex-
amined in the text accompanying notes 56-65 infra, in the discussion of nonrecognition. 
The second reason for delaying realization is solicitude for the taxpayer who might be 
forced to dispose of appreciated assets to raise cash to pay the tax on the appreciation. See 
note 33 Sllpra and accompanying text. Where the asset is being disposed of in any event, as in 
the liquidation setting, this concern is eliminated, except, again, in those situations in which 
the liquidation affects only the form of a continuing investment. 
1644 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1636 
theories might be advanced to support such a conclusion. First, if 
the distribution of the assets was business consumption,35 the initial 
premise of the deduction would be fulfilled.36 Dividends, however, 
are nondeductible,37 and the consumption of the assets by distribu-
tion to shareholders is, similarly, for non-business purposes. 
A second argument that the gain is dissipated before realization 
maintains that since upon liquidation the corporation must surren-
der all of its assets in exchange for worthless (upon redemption) 
stock, the assets have no value. Judge Weick relies on this argument 
in his Court of Appeals dissent in Tennessee-Caro/ina.38 According 
to this view, the corporation receives the stock for which the in-kind 
distribution is exchanged, not the assets; hence the assets' continued 
existence does not benefit the corporation.39 
35. Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) with I.R.C. § 262 (business, but not personal, expenses de-
ductible in computing net income). 
36. In other words, there would then have been no accumulation of expensed, but uncon-
sumed, assets. 
37. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, ~ 5.01, at 73. Even if the shareholder will ultimately 
consume the asset in pursuit of trade or business, the argument is unpersuasive, because in 
most cases the shareholder will take a stepped-up basis which would allow further deductions, 
See I.R.C. § 334; notes 61 & 63 infra. But see I.R.C § 334(b)(I) (providing for carryover basis 
for certain liquidations of subsidiaries). There should not be two business expense deductions 
by two different taxpayers where only one cost has been incurred. 
38. 582 F.2d at 385. 
39. Although the fair market value of the stock redeemed would be the amount realized 
under I.R.C. § 1001, that value is presumably the amount for which the recipient could sell the 
property. This amount is zero where the recipient is a liquidating corporation and the prop• 
erty is its own stock. Thus the majority's argument in Tennessee-Carolina that the receipt of 
stock was a "recovery," see note 109 infra and accompanying text, has rightly drawn criticism. 
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 6, at 231; Reveley & Pratt, supra note 6, at 418-20. The majority 
ignores the liquidation, which is an essential part of the "exchange," since without liquidation 
there would have been no transfer of the assets. 
The fact that there is no gain in the sense of I.R.C. § 1001 does not mean that the element 
of unrealized gain inherent in the previously expensed assets has disappeared; it has in fact 
been passed on to the shareholders. Gains earned while doing business in the corporate form 
cannot be shifted to the shareholders as dividends (that is, dividends are not deductible). Simi-
larly, the gain inherent in previously expensed assets was earned (though not realized) while in 
the corporate form, and should not be allowed to be shifted to the shareholders. See, e.g., 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930): 
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide 
that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements . • . • That seems to us 
the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according 
to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different 
tree from that on which they grew. 
For a discussion of income attribution between corporations and shareholders, see Molloy, 
Some Tax Aspects of Corporate .Distribution in Kind, 6 TAX. L. REV. 57, 61-65 (1950). 
The exception in I.R.C. § 336(a) for installment obligations clearly reflects a policy against 
this type of income shifting, since installment obligations represent income rather than prop-
erty. See Helvering v. Horst, 3 I I U.S. 112 (1940). But the general rule in § 336 indicates that 
at least some types of gains accrued while in the corporate form may be shifted to the share-
holders. The question of which type is addressed in notes 86-96 infra and accompanying text. 
Where the shareholder is a corporation, there is no problem of shifting income out of the 
corporate system, although there may be other problems depending on which basis rules ap-
ply. See note 61 infra. 
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But this argument focuses on the wrong event to determine gain. 
The gain on the expensed assets is realized upon the liquidation, 
since that event forecloses further consumption by the corporation in 
the trade or business. But the actual gain took place much earlier, 
when the corporation took a tax deduction without ultimately bear-
ing any expense related to the generation of net income.40 The dis-
position of the assets is therefore irrelevant to the question of the 
amount realized.41 Whether a corporation either sells its assets and 
distributes the cash to its shareholders or uses the assets in satisfac-
tion of debts, it realizes a gain on the disposition.42 Allowing- the 
corporation to escape tax liability merely by distributing assets in 
kind fails to address the actual event of realization and might en-
courage inefficient allocation of resources.43 Finally, the distribution 
itself represents a form of corporate "personal" consumption which 
benefits the corporation. To hold that a corporation has not benefit-
ted from the distribution would contradict the Code's treatment of 
dividends as essentially "personal" consumption, nondeductible in 
computing corporate net income.44 On this basis, the corporation 
40. Although the corporation paid for the assets, it premised a tax deduction on the con-
sumption of the assets in the course of the corporation's business. If the assets had been 
consumed, the tax paid would have reflected net income. The permanent retention of the 
assets realizes an untaxed accession to wealth. 
41. Judge Tannenwald's dissent in Tennessee-Carolina, 65 T.C. at 450 & n.l, fails to recog-
nize this crucial point. If the corporation's net worth is unaffected by the disposition of the 
assets it is only because net worth was already enhanced at the time of the original expense 
deduction. Strict adherence to the annual acounting principle, supra note 21, is not appropri-
ate to foreclose realization of this gain, because the doctrine of realization has long been ap-
plied to tax gains in years other than those in which they accrued "on paper." See notes 30-34 
supra and accompanying text. Because at the time of the deduction there is every reason to 
believe that the assets will be covered, deferral of tax is an appropriate use of the doctrine of 
realization. See note 32supra. As of the moment ofliquidation, deferral is no longer possible. 
The choices are realization or total exclusion; the latter is not a normally accepted consequence 
of the doctrine of realization. 
42. The amount realized would be the sale price or the amount of debt discharged. See 
I.R.C. § l00I(b); Treas. Reg.§ l.1001~2(a) (1980). This is not to say that 1.R.C. § 337 will not 
provide for nonrecognition; that is a separate question. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the gain accrues to the corporation at the time it took the deduction, although that gain is not 
realized until business consumption of the assets as contemplated by the deduction is no longer 
possible. 
43. For example, assume that a liquidating corporation has $1000 in cash, $1000 in previ-
ously expensed assets and debts totalling $1000. The creditor may be indifferent to receiving 
the assets, whereas the shareholders might strongly prefer the cash. However, if the distribu-
tion of cash is taxed and the distribution of assets is not, the assets may be diverted to those 
who value them less to get the advantage of the tax break. The problem is avoided as long as 
both distributions receive the same treatment, whether taxed or not. This same argument fa-
vors consistent application of nonrecognition under I.R.C. §§ 336 and 337. 
44. See note 37 supra. To illustrate this point, consider a simple case in which a corpora-
tion earns no net income in one year and pays a $1000 dividend out of accumulated earnings. 
Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, the corporation would have a net loss of $1000 
(from the decrease in savings) unless the $1000 dividend is treated as ''the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption." The Code requirement that net income be reported as zero 
(since dividends are not deductible) is consistent with a policy recognizing dividends as being 
just like any oiher form of non-business expenditure and, as such, a form of consumption that 
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should be charged with a gain equal to the value of the assets in the 
hands of the shareholders.45 
C. Recognition of Gain 
Given that the corporation realizes a gain on the distribution of 
previously expensed assets, the question qf whether the gain should 
be recognized requires examination of the policies underlying the 
various nonrecognition provisions in the Code. 
1. Section 336 
The fundamental premise underlying section 336 is that when a 
corporation distributes appreciated assets, it realizes no gain as a re-
sult of the appreciation.46 A corporation could not assign its income 
to shareholders and thus avoid the double taxation of dividends,47 
so the assumption that appreciation is not realized does not under-
mine the conclusion that previously unrealized ordinary income is 
realized upon distribution.48 Appreciation of capital assets of the 
corporation may reasonably be viewed as appreciation of the equity 
shareholders' interests, with the transfer to the shareholders merely 
is presumably of value to the consumer. Treatment of dividends as a form of consumption is 
analogous to Professor Simons' argument that gifts should be treated as a form of consumption 
by the donor. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 57 (1938). (Professor Simons' 
suggestion regarding gifts has never found favor in the tax Code, perhaps because of the sepa• 
rate system of estate and gift taxes.) The argument that the shareholder's benefit on liquida-
tion should be taxable to the corporation favors consistent application of nonrecognition under 
I.R.C. §§ 336 and 3 l l (nonliquidating distributions in kind). 
45. It is difficult to imagine why the value in the hands of the shareholders would be differ-
ent than the value to the corporation. Before liquidation a nonmarketable asset may have a 
peculiarly high value to the corporation, but upon liquidation the asset must be marketable to 
be of value to either the corporation or the shareholders. See note 71 i'!fi-a. On the other 
hand, the asset may have special value to the shareholders, who continue the enterprise, but 
this would presumably be no higher than the preliquidation value to the corporation. The 
value of nonmarketable assets to be taxed could, therefore, depend upon whether the enter-
prise is to be continued by the shareholders. 
46. See General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); S. REP. No. 1622, 
supra note 14, at 46; Molloy, supra note 39, at 56 & n.16. 
41. See Arent, Rea/location of Income and Expenses in Connection with Formation and Liq-
uidation of Corporations, 40 TAXES 995, 998-99 (1962): 
For at least two decades the courts have been zealous in ther efforts (1) to prevent corpo-
rations from shifting their tax burdens to their shareholders and (2) to prevent avoidance 
of the double tax which has been the traditional exaction for the privilege of conducting 
business in the corporate form. 
To allow the income to be tr_!lllsferred to the shareholder violates the judicial assignment of 
income doctrine, see note 39 supra, which has been held to override§ 336, See Williamson v. 
United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961) 
48. The idea that a corporation does not realize appreciation is not an exception to the 
prohibition against shifting income to shareholders, see note 39 supra, that is granted for liqui-
dations. General lltilities, 296 U.S. 200, cited in the legislative history of§ 336, see S. REP. 
1622, supra note 14, at 46, involved a nonliquidating distribution, and I.R.C. § 311 applies the 
rule of§ 336 to nonliquidating distributions. Therefore the exception in §§ 311 and 336 to the 
general rule against shifting corporate income to shareholders must relate to the nature of the 
gain embodied in the assets, rather than the corporation's liquidation. 
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e.ff ecting a change in the division of the form in which that interest is 
held.49 By contrast, earnings of the corporation are clearly subject to 
tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels.50 
The conclusion embodied in section 336 that appreciation is not 
taxable to the corporation is not inescapable,51 but is justified on the 
same grounds as section 351, which provides nonrecognition of gain 
to individuals on transfer of assets in exchange for stock of a corpo-
ration which they will control. 52 Both provisions allow for changing 
the form of enterprise without artificial tax barriers. 53 If efficiency 
reasons favor incorporation of a sole proprietorship (perhaps to fa-
cilitate raising capital), the incorporation might nevertheless fail to 
take place without section 351 because the taxpayer would have to 
forego the benefit of deferral provided by the doctrine of realization. 
Section 336 similarly removes the artificial tax barriers to a change 
from corporate to unincorporated form. Recognizing a gain on ap-
preciated assets would create a tax liability that could be postponed 
by continuing to function as a corporation. Thus even where effi-
ciency reasons dictated a change, the corporation would nevertheless 
continue. This rationale applies only to transfers in the ownership of 
the capital assets of the corporation. The accumulated earnings of 
the corporation cannot be permitted to be transferred tax-free to a 
sole proprietorship without creating artificial incentives to disincor-
porate. 54 To the extent of previous deductions from ordinary in-
come, previously expensed assets constitute accumulated earnings,55 
and should not, as a matter of rational tax policy, come under sec-
tion 336. 
2. Other Nonrecognition Rationales 
Aside from the special concerns evident in section 336, nonrecog-
49. That is, part of the shareholders' investment merely changes form from ownership of 
equity shares in the corporation's capital (as opposed to earnings) to ownership of the capital 
assets themselves. See notes 56-62 i,!fra. 
50. See notes 39 & 47 supra. Allowing corporations to shift their income to their share-
holders to escape taxation at the corporate level clearly violates the policy embodied in I.R.C. 
§ 341 (collapsible corporations). See I.R.C. §§ 34l(a), (b)(l)(A). 
51. The appreciation was a form of gain accruing to the corporation while it held the 
assets; one view is that the corporation should no more be allowed to shift this form of income 
than any other. See notes 39 & 47 supra. But see notes 53 & 63 i,!fra. 
52. 1.R.C. § 351. 
53. On the legislative purpose behind§ 351, see Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 
F.2d 479,488 (1st Cir. 1940) (discussing§ 112(b) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of§ 351); 
Arent, supra note 47, at 996 (policy permitting flexibility in movement to the incorporated 
form); Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization: The Threat of the "Potential Income" Item 
and a Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinness, 40 TAXES 974, 979 (1962) (change in form 
only). Arent views I.R.C. § 333 (see note 63 i,!fra) and I.R.C. § 336 as limited corollaries to 
§ 351 dealing with change out of the corporate form. Arent, supra note 47, at 999. 
54. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text. 
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nition may be theoretically based on one of three general princi-
ples. 56 First is the notion that identity of interest between the 
transferor and the transferee means that in e.ff ect no transfer has 
taken place. From the proposition that there has been no transfer it 
follows that the basis in the property is unchanged. For gifts, for 
example, the donee takes the donor's basi~ - a carryover basis.57 It 
may be reasonable to view the shareholder and the corporation as a 
single interest when the corporation is created since it has no prior 
existence. The transfer of the property to the corporation under sec-
tion 351 divides the single interest of the individual into a personal 
and corporate interest. 58 And, consistent with the assumed identity 
of interest, the corporation takes a carryover basis from the trans-
feror. 59 The situation di.ff ers, however, on liquidation. Although 
ownership of the capital assets of the corporation is arguably an in-
terest common to both the corporation and its shareholders, which 
may be recombined through liquidation without tax consequence, 
the Code clearly establishes the corporation and its shareholders as 
separate entities for taxation purposes through the double taxation of 
income of corporations and shareholders. 60 Thus the transfer of 
earned but untaxed corporate income to the shareholders amounts to 
a transfer between distinct entities.61 
A second general theory of nonrecogntion involves the continuity 
56. Even if nonrecognition would be theoretically justified under one of these principles, 
the Code made it clear, at least prior to the repeal of I.R.C. § 1002, that gains were to be 
recognized unless nonrecognition is explicitly provided in the Code. 
57. I.R.C. § 1015(a). Note that the carryover basis is limited to fair market value at the 
time of the transfer for computing losses to prevent the abuse that could result if losses could 
be shifted from low bracket to high bracket taxpayers (another example of the congressional 
policy against income shifting). Another exception to the carryover basis that accompanies 
nonrecognition is § 1014, providing a fair market value basis to the distributees of decendent's 
estates despite nonrecognition of gain to the estate. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, ~ 4.01, at 
59. This stepped-up basis has been criticized by commentators, see H. SIMONS, supra note 23, 
at 164-65, 208, and was eliminated by J.R.C. § 1023 (1976), which was, however, repealed 
before it became effective. The step-up in basis allowed by§ 1014 should not extend to liqui-
dating corporations, despite any similarities between the death of an individual and the liqui-
dation of a corporation. The most important distinction is that death of an individual invokes 
a separate system of estate taxes. In addition, the justification often given for § 1014, that 
computation of the decedents basis imposes administrative burdens, would not apply to a cor-
poration because the corporation will have much better records than most individuals. Fi-
nally, it is unlikely that Congress would view the liquidation of a corporation, which often 
indicates only a change in enterprise form, as an occasion calling for the same degree of solici-
tude as the death of an individual. 
58. See I.R.C. §§ 361,362. As in the case of gifts, the statute attempts to prevent manipu-
lation to recognize losses. 
59. I.R.C. § 362(a). 
60. J.R.C. §§ 11, 6l(a)(7); B. BJTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20. 
61. A second argument against viewing the corporation and its shareholders as a single 
unit is the that in most situations the shareholder's basis in his equity share of the corporation 
will be unrelated to the corporation's basis in its assets. An exception might be a closely held 
corporation formed under§ 351, for which the corporation and the original shareholders have 
the same basis in the capital assets. But even here, an identity of interest rationale would not 
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of a taxpayer's investment, as exemplified by the nonrecognition of 
gain in like-kind exchanges.62 In these situations, recognition of gain 
on an exchange deters efficient changes in the form of an investment. 
The Code's solution is to allow nonrecognition, but require the in-
vestor to carry his basis in the old property over to the new prop-
erty. 63 The continuity of investment rationale may justify 
apply to accumulated earnings, unless the system of dual taxation, see notes 37 & 60 supra, is 
to be ignored. 
Where the shareholder is a parent corporation, it is easier to view the boundary between 
the shareholder and the corporation as insubstantial. In fact, only in that situation does the 
transferee take the transferor's basis. I.R.C. § 334(b)(l). In other situations, the transferee's 
basis is either fair market value (after recognizing a gain to the transferee), or is derived from 
his basis in the shares of stock. I.R.C. § 334(a), (c). Even where a subsidiary is liquidated by a 
parent, the transferee does not always take the transferor's basis. Kimbell-Diamond Milling 
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), qffd per curlam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 827 (1951), established the rule, now codified at I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), that where one 
corporation buys the shares of a second corporation which is promptly liquidated, the 
purchase of shares is treated as a direct purchase of the subsidiary's assets, and the parent's 
basis in those assets is determined by a pro rata allocation of the price paid for the stock. See 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.334-l(c), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 66, 142; amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2 C.B 138; 
T.D 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176. 
Where the liquidating corporation is a subsidiary and the parent takes the transferor's 
basis in the assets, there is no danger of corporate earnings escaping the corporate system, 
since one, and only one, corporate tax will be imposed in any event. Even so, there may be 
some difference in tax liability. I.R.C. § 482 permits allocation of gains and losses to the 
"right" corporation to avoid abuse, although this may be difficult in practice. 
62. See I.R.C. § 1031; see, e.g., Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453,456 (2d 
Cir. 1959). The nonrecognition for involuntary conversions under § 1033 can also be ex-
plained in terms of continuity of investment, although solicitude for taxpayer hardship is prob-
ably at least an equally likely motivation. 
63. Ordinarily, when shareholders receive liquidating distributions, they are deemed under 
§ 331 to have sold their stock in exchange for the assets received, and thus there is no question 
ofa continuing investment. I.R.C. § 331(a)(l). The taxpayer recognizes a gain or loss equal to 
the difference between fair market value of assets received and the shareholder's basis in the 
stock, I.R.C. § 1001, and gets a basis in the assets equal to fair market value, I.R.C. § 334(a). 
However, § 333 allows the shareholder not to recognize a gain on the shares on a continuity 
of investment theory. I.R.C. § 333(e) provides that gain will be recognized only on that por-
tion of the distribution which represents accumulated corporate earnings and profits, 
§ 333(e)(l), and any remaining gain which is received in the form of cash or securities, 
§ 333(e)(2). It seems fair to view previously expensed assets, to the extent that deductions for 
them have offset income, to be viewed as a form of earnings and profits to the corporation (and 
thus taxable) once the proper time for realization has arrived. Under § 333, the taxpayer's 
investment in the shares and in the assets received in liquidation are viewed as a single invest-
ment, with a change in form only. Section 333 removes artificial tax barriers to liquidations of 
closely held corporations in which the shareholders continue the business as one or more unin-
corporated sole proprietorships or partnerships. The source of§ 333 is a temporary provision 
designed to relieve the hardship imposed by the rule change imposing additional tax on re-
tained earnings of personal holding companies. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 500, 52 
Stat. 557 (now I.R.C. § 541). It was believed that this latter provision would force virtually all 
personal holding corporations into unincorporated form, since the tax avoidance advantage of 
these corporations was eliminated, and even the normal corporate advantage of accumulating 
earnings without personal tax liability was disallowed. In § 333, Congress made the temporary 
relief provision permanent, despite the fact that its original purpose of avoiding the harshness 
of the rule change regarding personal holding companies no longer applied. No explanation is 
given for making § 333 permanent, see S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 256, but the con-
tinuity of investment rationale seems to fit. To the extent that § 333 allows nonrecognition, the 
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nonrecognition of the shareholders' gain, but as noted previously,64 
the corporation's investment does not continue beyond liquidation 
unless the corporation and its successor can be viewed as a single 
entity. Where the investment is transferred to a new entity, it is ap-
propriate to close all transactions and recognize the corporation's 
gain.6S 
A :final theory of nonrecognition involves the liquidity problem.66 
In most cases involving a transfer sufficient as an event of realization 
there is no issue of liquidation of the appreciated asset; it is an ac-
complished fact. But in some cases, such as the reversion of rental 
property improved by the lessee, 67 or discharge of indebtedness, 68 
gains are realized without improving the cash position of the tax-
payer. In these cases, out of concern for hardship, Congress has 
granted nonrecognition,69 with basis provisions70 to ensure that gain 
is only deferred, and not permanently excluded. 
In most corporate liquidation settings, the imposition of tax will 
not force the liquidation of a going concern.71 Where the corpora-
tion's business will continue through its successors in interest, there 
taxpayer carries over his basis in his shares. I.R.C. § 334(c). Basis is adjusted to reflect gains 
recognized under the exceptions to the general rule of nonrecognition. 
64. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text. 
65. While it may seem somewhat arbitrary to distinguish between corporation's and share• 
holders' gain, the distinction is necessary unless manipulation to avoid the double taxation of 
dividends is to be permitted. 
66. See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text. 
61. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (holding that a taxpayer realizes gain on 
the receipt of his reversionary interest with improvements made by the lessee). But see I.R.C. 
§ 109 (providing nonrecognition unless improvements amount to rent). 
68. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931) (holding that a taxpayer 
realizes gain when indebtedness is discharged). Bui see I.R.C. § 108(a)(l)(C) (providing defer-
ral by offsetting favorable tax attributes against discharge of indebtedness income). 
69. I.R.C. § 109 provides that income does not include income attributable to improve-
ments by the lessee which are received when the lease is terminated. However, this provision 
does not apply where the gain amounts to rent. 
I.R.C. §108 excludes gain from discharge of indebtedness for insolvent debtors or electing 
business debtors. I.R.C. § 108(a)(l)(C), (d)(4). 
70. See I.R.C. §§ 108(b), 108(c), 1019. I.R.C. § 1017(d) ensures that the basis reduction 
taken upon discharge of indebtedness is recovered as ordinary income (and not converted to 
capital gain by the sale of an asset whose basis has been reduced under § 108). 
71. Since the going concern is being liquidated in any event, little hardship is likely to 
result from having to sell the asset to pay the tax on the gain. One hardship could arise where 
the gain associated with a previous expense deduction is inseverable from another capital asset 
of the corporation. For example, in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 
(9th Cir. 1963), the previously expensed item was improvements to land to prepare it for a 
potato crop. The gain to the corporation under the theory advanced in this Note arises when 
the corporation has the benefit of the improvements and is relieved of the obligation to use 
those improvements in the trade or business. But since this benefit is inextricably tied to the 
land, the value of the benefit depends on the increment to the value of the land due to the 
improvements. If, as in South Lake Farms, the land is transferred to a potato farmer, the full 
value of the improvements presumably represents an addition to the land's value. If, however, 
the land were sold to a developer, the preparation for the potato crop would presumably have 
added nothing to the value of the land, and the corporation's benefit would be zero. 
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is reason for solicitude which would justify deferral, but not p·erma-
nent exclusion, of the tax liability. Since in most liquidation settings 
the transferee takes a stepped-up basis,72 nonrecognition would re-
sult in exclusion rather than deferral of the tax. Thus nonrecogni-
tion in these situations would result in greater relief than Congress 
has been willing to give in other hardship nonrecognition settings, 73 
and should be denied absent clear evidence of congressional intent. 
To summarize Part I, the corporation gains when assets are ex-
pensed and not consumed, and this gain is realized upon liquidation. 
Neither the apparent purpose of Congress in passing section 336 nor 
the theoretical rationale for that or other nonrecognition sections jus-
tifies nonrecognition of the gain that results from the previous ex-
pense treatment. 74 The remaining question is whether, 
notwithstanding these theoretical arguments, the Code mandates 
that the distribution of previously expensed assets not be taxed. 
72. See note 61 supra. I.R.C. § 334(b)(l) (liquidation of subsidiary not recently acquired) 
is the exception, and there would be little potential for abuse if nonrecognition applied there. 
There is an argument that in liquidations covered by§ 334(b)(2) there is no real difference 
between recognizing or not recognizing the gain on expensed assets, because of the rules for 
determining basis. This argument is best illustrated with an example. Assume the entire net 
assets of the subsidiary consist of$100 worth of previously expensed property, and the parent 
acquires its stock (plus any tax liabilities) for $50 paid to the shareholder. If the subsidiary is 
forced to recognize the $100 gain, the parent's basis would be computed as follows: $50 for the 
price paid for the stock plus $50 (approximately) for the tax liability of the subsidiary assumed, 
Treas. Reg. § l.334-l(c)(4)(v)(a)(l), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2 
C.B. 138, T.D. 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176, plus a refinement of approximately $50 to account for 
earnings and profits accumulated after the purchase of the subsidiary's stock and before liqui-
dation. In R.M. Smith v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 317 (1977), qjfd, 591 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 
1979), the court concluded (questionably) that recapture constituted interim earnings and prof-
its under regulation. The parent pays out $50, incurs tax liability on $100 and gets property 
worth $100 plus the ability to deduct $150 as an expense for the consumption of the property. 
Netting out the tax liability on $100 with the deductions of $150 gives a net deduction of $50 
(assuming both corporations pay tax at the same rate). 
If instead there were no recapture tax liability, the parent buys the stock for $50 and takes a 
deductible basis of $50. 
There are two flaws in this argument. First, it assumes the correctness of the result in.R. M. 
Smith. Second, even if that case is correct, the analysis described above applies only if the 
entire amount of the additions to basis for tax liability and interim earnings and profits are 
allocable to expensable assets. If the recapture tax liability were viewed as a lien, then the 
addition to basis would be applied directly to the previous expensed assets. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.334-l(c)(4)(viii), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2 C.B. 138, T.D. 
7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176. But since the tax liability on previously expensed assets is the result of 
previous deductions against income unrelated to the specific property, the adjustment should 
more reasonably be allocated over all property, including capital and nondepreciable assets. 
See Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 
TAXES 902, 919-20 (1976); O'Hare, Application of tax benefit rule in new case threatens certain 
liquidations, 44 J. TAX. 200, 202-203 (1976). See generally Forte, supra note 6. 
73. Except in the case of death. See I.R.C. § 1014. 
74. Because of the carryover basis in liquidations under§ 334(b)(l), there is deferral, but 
not exemption from tax. Further, even if income_ is shifted, it remains in the corporate system 
and within the overall structure of the same parent corporation. A requirement to realize and 
recognize gains upon changes solely in corporate form may erect a tax barrier to efficient 
reorganization. I.R.C. § 482 (permitting allocation of income and deductions) is adequate to 
prevent abuse. 
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JI. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
Part I argues that, as a matter of tax policy, a corporation should 
pay the applicable tax on the value of previously expensed assets 
distributed in liquidation, up to a maximum of the amount resulting 
in a previous tax benefit. C<;>ngress could surely achieve this result, 
and has come close to adopting appropriate legislation. 75 Whether a 
court can derive such a rule through a principled exercise of legal 
method poses a more difficult question. The apparently unequivocal 
language of section 336 presents an obvious obstacle. Even on its 
face, however, that language may apply only to gains that result 
from asset appreciation and not to tax benefits. From the available 
evidence, Congress clearly seems to have intended this result. And 
regardless of the interpretation given to section 336, section 111 may 
affirmatively impose the tax benefit rule· to previously expensed as-
sets distributed in liquidation. This Part explores these ambiguities 
and contradictions in the Code, and concludes that the statute does 
not forbid, and may require, applying the tax benefit rule in this situ-
ation. The court should not hesitate to adopt a reasonable construc-
tion of the Code that fulfills fundamental tax policies that alternative 
constructions completely disregard. 
A. The Language of Section 336 
Section 336 provides that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a 
corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete 
liquidation."76 This wording might appear to preclude taxation of 
the corporation's gain from the deduction of the cost of assets not 
ultimately consumed in the course of business, but rather distributed 
upon liquidation. The courts have struggled with similar language, 
attempting to exclude previously expensed assets from its scope. 77 
Precisely understood, however, even a literal interpretation of the 
75. H.R. 10,936, 94th Congress, introduced Dec. 10, 1975, would have extended § 1245 
recapture to previously expensed assets. The bill was passed by the House, but the Congress 
adjourned in 1976 before the Senate had time to act on the bill. See Armagost, Assets /he Sale 
of Which May Trigger /he Recognition of Gain in Sec/ion 337 Liquidations, 29 S. CAL. TAX 
INST. 375, 446-48 (1977). Committee reports to both houses of Congress favored passage of the 
bill. See S. REP. No. 1346, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1350, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1976). 
76. I.R.C. § 336. 
77. For example, in Anders v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 1283 {10th Cir. 1969), the court 
considered the meaning of the similar "gain on property" language used in § 337. See notes 
13-14 supra. Given the purpose of§ 337 to provide consistent results for distribution of assets 
or proceeds, see note 14 supra, judicial approaches to § 337 are highly relevant to interpreta-
tion of§ 336. 
Based on structural similarities between the definitions of "property" in § 337 and of "capi-
tal asset" in§ 1221, the court concluded that "property" in § 336 means capital assets. 414 
F.2d at 1285, 1287. The court reasoned that even if a transaction involves disposition, its 
proceeds need not be treated as a gain on sale. The expense treatment did not produce a 
depreciated basis, which is required in computing a gain on sale. 414 F.2d at 1288. Since 
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section need not bar application of the tax benefit rule to previously 
expensed assets distributed in liquidation. 
The section's scope will vary with the meaning attributed to the 
word "on." If "on" refers to any gain which accrues to the corpora-
tion at the time of the liquidation,78 the section's nonrecognition pro-
vision would encompass previously expensed assets, because the 
corporation does not realize a net tax benefit until liquidation en-
sures that the expensed assets will not be consumed as contemplated 
by the deduction of their original cost. In a temporal sense, tax ben-
efits and asset appreciation are indistinguishable in relation to the 
time of the liquidation. Given that Congress plainly intended not to 
recognize "any gain" on asset appreciation, a temporal interpretation 
of "on" would therefore require nonrecognition of the tax benefit 
accrued through the distribution of previously expensed assets. 
But "on" may also assume a causal significance, and it is this 
meaning of the worcl which seems to correspond most precisely with 
its statutory use.79 If "any gain on the distribution" of the assets 
refers to those gains which arise from the distribution following liq-
uidation, a court could reasonably exclude the tax benefit gained 
from the distribution of previously expensed assets from the sc_ope of 
section 336. The gain "on" the distribution would then refer only to 
any appreciation in the value of the assets themselves, for the tax 
benefit conferred by the deduction of their original cost accrues to 
the corporation whether or not liquidation ultimately takes place. 
The corporation does not realize that gain until the offsetting expec-
tation of consuming the expensed assets is discharged by liquidation, 
expensed items have no basis, and are by definition not capital assets, neither the capital gains 
model nor § 337 apply, according to this argument. 
This approach is unpersuasive, since the similarities between the definitions of property in 
§§ 337 and 1221 are at best superficial. In following the Anders decision, the Tax Court has 
relied more _on the overall structure of the Code and the legislative history to conclude that 
§ 337 applies to appreciation of assets, and not to gains based on prior deductions from ordi-
nary income. See Commissioner v. Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). While technically 
correct, this conclusion does not justify rejecting § 336 as facially inapplicable to diposition in 
liquidation of previously expensed assets. 
78. "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, 
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). "On" can mean "occurrence during," AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 917 (1978), so that any gain to the corpo-
ration during the liquidation and distribution, including the windfall generated by previous 
expense treatment of distributed assets, should not be recognized under § 336. See, e.g., VII 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 114 (1933). 
79. "On" may also "indicate an originating or sustaining source of agency; live on bread 
and water; make a profit on gambling." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 917 (1978). The OED gives a more precise sense of this meaning as used in the 
statute: "Indicating that which forms the basis of income, taxation, borrowing, betting, profit, 
or loss." VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 115 (1933). This seems the most reasonable 
applicable definition, and suggests that § 336 applies only to gains for which the liquidation 
"forms the basis of income." This plainly does not encompass the tax benefit from the prior 
deduction, which the corporation enjoys whether or not it ultimately liquidates. 
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but this, like the fiction of consumption at the time of deduction 
which gives rise to the windfall in the first place, is an accounting 
convention rather than an event of economic significance. 80 Since 
the gain, ie., the tax benefit, represented by the value of the ex-
pensed assets, 81 resulted from the original purchase of the assets and 
the subsequent deduction of their cost, a court could reasonably con-
clude that such an accession to wealth amounts to a gain "on" the 
deduction of the cost of the assets, realized rather than engendered 
by the liquidation. 
B. Congressional Intent 
Several extrinsic indicia of congressional intent support this in-
terpretation of section 336. First, the parallel interpretation of sec-
tion 33782 . strengthens the case for excluding previously expensed 
assets from nonrecognition under section 336. Since sections 337 
and 336 attempt to provide identical tax treatment in this context, 83 
the two should be consistently construed where possible. 84 Congress 
80. This interpretation was adopted in the § 337 context by the Third Circuit in Hempt 
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1180 (3d Cir. 1974). The court held that§ 337 does 
not apply to transactions that have significance independent of the act of liquidation. The 
benefit to the taxpayer of appreciation of property has no tax consequences except upon sale, 
and the gain is clearly a "gain on sale." For previously expensed assets, however, the benefit to 
the taxpayer relates to the initial expense treatment, and the liquidating sale is merely a conve-
nient time to realize the gain. This view is consistent with the position taken in Part I that the 
foreclosure of any possibility of consumption in trade or business, and not the disposition 
itself, is the event of realization of gain to the corporation. Indeed, the court in Hemp/ Bros. 
reached this result on tax policy grounds, rather than as the result of any involved textual 
exegesis of§ 337. But implicit in this result is the attribution of causal significance to "on," a 
meaning which seems, even based on the text alone, more reasonable than the temporal 
alternative. · 
81. It should be noted that the market value of the assets is relevant only as the statutory 
measure of the tax benefit conferred by the failure to consume them. Under§ 111, recovery of 
amounts previously deducted is taxed up to a maximum of the amount which gave rise to a tax 
benefit, since any loss suffered on the purchase and distribution of the assets amounts to an 
actual business expense of the sort for which the deduction was taken. To the extent a gain is 
realized beyond the amount which gave rise to a tax benefit, the accession to wealth repre-
sented arises from actual asset appreciation clearly within the ambit of § 336, and would not 
exist if the assets were ultimately consumed as originally intended rather than distributed in 
liquidation. This merely reexpresses the distinction between gains "on" the purchase of the 
assets and gains "on" their distribution; the gains causally attributable to purchase are not 
gains "on" the distribution, while gains causally attributable to the distribution, i.e., asset ap-
preciation, are not recognized by the force of§ 336. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See, e.g., cases cited in note 15 supra; see note 14 supra. 
83. See note 14 supra. 
84. There are express differences between the two sections, but only where required by the 
fundamental differences between proceeds and property. For example, § 337 deals with invol-
untarily converted property, which by definition cannot be distributed in kind. Section 337's 
exceptions for sale (other than in bulk) of stock in trade and for collapsible corporations are 
necessary because these sales would represent income in the ordinary course of business, rather 
than a mere distribution of unappreciated property. See note 18 supra. 
None of the§ 337 holdings, see note l4supra, has specifically followed a presumed§ 336 
result. But see Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 680-81 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., 
concurring) (§ 337 should be governed by law applicable to § 336); Midland-Ross Corp. v. 
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has had years to correct any misinterpretation entailed by these deci-
sions; its failure to act reinforces the conclusion that the tax benefit 
rule applies under these circumstances. 85 
Second, as both courts and commentators have recognized, these 
sections reflect no intention to provide nonrecognition for any gains 
or losses other than those resulting from asset appreciation or depre-
ciation. 86 The legislative history of section 336 plainly supports this 
conclusion;87 the section derives from a Treasury Regulation provid-
ing nonrecognition "however [the assets] may have appreciated or 
depreciated in value since their acquisition."88 This history does not 
suggest any intention to sanction the sort of windfall that would re-
sult from the untaxed distribution of previously expensed assets. 
Finally, the structure of the Code, and particularly the enumer-
ated exceptions to section 336, suggest that Congress intended it to 
apply to appreciation, and not to "gain" that results from prior tax 
treatment. Although none of the three statutory exceptions to sec-
tion 336(a)89 applies to previously expensed assets, two of those ex-
United States, 485 F.2d 110, 118 (6th Cir. 1973). Whether the courts have tacitly assumed that 
the tax benefit rule would override § 336 or that some disparity in treatment under the two 
sections is acceptable is not clear. 
85. Legislative acquiescence to a judicial interpretation is probative of the interpretation's 
consonance with congressional will. "When a court says to a legislature: •you ( or your prede-
cessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer 'We did not.'" G. CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32 (1982). 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed this view of legislative adoption of judicial 
interpretations through the refusal to change the statute in question. See Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982) (''the fact that a compre-
hensive reexamination and significant amendment of the CEA left intact ·the statutory provi-
sions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that 
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 
580-81 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpreta-
tion of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change."). 
After such a major revision of the Internal Revenue Code as the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981, it is not unreasonable to view the prevailing interpretations of the unchanged portions 
of the Code, including§§ 336 and 337, as having been ratified by the legislative branch. 
86. See Arent, supra note 47, at 1001 (citing S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 258-59); 
Lyon, Ordinary Income May Arise in Section 337 Sale Under Assignment of Income .Doctrine, 
16 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1962) (')lnderlying purpose related only to asset appreciation"); O'Hare, 
supra note 6, at 236. 
87. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, su_pra note 
14, at 258. 
88. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) provides that "[n]o gain or loss is realized by a 
corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation 
however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition." See 
Broenan, supra note 6, at 236. 
89. I.R.C. § 336(a) explicitly excludes installment obligations. These are excluded on the 
assignment of income principle, which is a tax doctrine forbidding income earned by one tax-
payer to be assigned to a second taxpayer and taxed at the second taxpayer's rate. See B. 
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, ~ 1.05, at 1-18; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: 
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. Rev. 293 (1962). Installment 
obligations represent inchoate income already earned by the corporation, and not "property." 
See note 39 supra. The other two exceptions, for LIFO and depreciation recapture amounts, 
are discussed in notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text. 
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ceptions are closely related to the prior expense problem. Section 
336(b) excludes a "LIFO recapture amount"90 from the general non-
recognition rule of section 336 when the last-in, first-out (LIFO) in-
ventory accounting method has been used. Compared to the first-in, 
first-out (FIFO) method, the LIFO method overstates (in a period of 
rising costs) the cost basis of assets sold or consumed out of inven-
tory, with a concomitant understatement of taxable income and of 
the basis of the remaining inventory. Thus for the LIFO inventory, 
as for the previously expensed asset, a component of the excess in 
asset value realized results from accounting methods that overstate 
the cost of assets actually consumed in each tax year91 and thus un-
derstate income for those years. Section 336(b ), as well as section 
3ll{b), which provides the same treatment for nonliquidating distri-
butions, reflects a policy against extending nonrecognition to this 
type of gain, which is in essence deferred ordinary income.92 
Section 1245 reveals a similar congressional policy with respect 
to disposition of assets on which depreciation deductions have been 
allowed. As in the case of LIFO inventory, the difference between 
fair mar~et value ( or sale price) and adjusted basis in part results 
from the prior allowance of depreciation in excess of true cost.93 The 
recapture of this amount under section 1245 is excluded from the 
application of section 336.94 The dissent in Tennessee-Carolina sug-
gests a distinction between depreciation and expense deductions, 
90. I.R.C. § 336(b). The LIFO recapture amount is the excess of the inventory value calcu-
lated by the FIFO method over the value calculated by the LIFO method. I.R.C. § 336(b)(3). 
91. See notes 26, 27, 40 & 55 supra and accompanying text. 
92. Whether LIFO or FIFO more accurately reflects the cost of assets consumed is debata-
ble. LIFO measures the replacement cost of assets used, whereas FIFO requires the user to 
realize the appreciation (assuming rising costs) of assets acquired earlier by using them first. 
Whichever approach one finds more persuasive, the Code's LIFO recapture provisions indi-
cate that Congress views FIFO as representing economic reality. In contrast, there is no doubt 
that the existence of expensed assets represents deductions that, in aggregate, have exceeded 
consumption. 
93. Professor Kahn argues that accelerated depreciation is not unnecessary or excessive, 
even when later market value exceeds the adjusted basis. See Kahn,Acce/erated JJepreciatlon. 
Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance far Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. I (1979). 
Professor Kahn's argument is that the accelerated depreciation accurately reflects an allocation 
of the cost of the asset that might be made at the time of purchase, whereas the later market 
value of the asset reflects the fact that use of the asset near the end of its life, which was heavily 
discounted in the a priori allocation of cost, is, at the time of resale, closer at hand and thus 
worth more. In this sense, the difference between market value and adjusted basis is a gain 
derived from holding a capital asset over a period of time, and thus should be subjected to 
capital gains treatment (the result before the enactment of§ 1245), and not ordinary income 
treatment (the result under § 1245). Whether or not Professor Kahn is correct, § 1245 indicates 
that Congress intends to tax as ordinary income gains that are the result of what it believes are 
unrealistic deductions against prior years' ordinary income rather than appreciation. There is 
little doubt that expensed assets which are not consumed or do not otherwise become worthless 
fall into the category of unrealistic cost deductions. 
94. See I.R.C. § 1245(b)(3) (excluding transactions in which the transferee takes the trans-
feror's basis under I.R.C. §§ 332, 351 and 361, among others, but not mentioning §§ 336 or 
337). 
August 1982] Note - Expensed Assets in Liquidations 1657 
without elaborating on why the two should be distinguished.95 
While the Code provisions for depreciation existing at the time of 
Tennessee-Carolina referred to an allowance for wear and tear96 
rather than recovery of a direct cost permitted by the expense deduc-
tion, the new section 16897 makes clear that depreciation deductions 
constitute a form of cost recovery, distinguishable from expense de-
ductions only in terms of timing. Further, an election to expense 
depreciable property under section 179 subjects the taxpayer to re-
capture liability under section 1245.98 It is unlikely that Congress 
intended that similar types of cost recovery deductions should be 
treated differently. More probably, Congress simply saw no ne~d to 
deal with nondepreciable assets since they are presumed to be con-
sumed when expensed. The LIFO and depreciation recapture exclu-
sions from section 336 imply that Congress intended to accord 
nonrecognition only to actual asset appreciation. 
This evidence of congressional intent may prove persuasive even 
if the proposed interpretation of the language of section 336 is re-
jected. While revenue acts may be subject to a rule of strict construc-
tion,99 the interpretation of any statute has the purpose of fulfilling, 
in some sense, the purposes of the legislature. 10° Courts have occa-
sionally declined to look beyond the statutory language absent ob-
scurity or ambiguity, 101 but this mechanical approach can only 
increase the difficulty of determining the legislative will. 102 Evidence 
95. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 454 (1975) (Tannen-
wald, J., dissenting). Tannenwald cites Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 
1074 (1933), affd., 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934), for the proposition that expenses and deprecia-
tion deductions are fundamentally different. At issue was whether player contracts with an 
option clause should be expensed or amortized over three years, but the question was decided 
merely on the basis of the useful life of the contract in view of the option clause. Thus only the 
timing of the deduction, and no more fundamental distinction, appears t'! have been involved. 
96. See I.R.C. § I67(a) (reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence). 
97. I.R.C. § 168 (Accelerated Cost Recovery System). This section applies to most forms 
of depreciable property put in service after December 31, 1980. I.R.C. § 168{c){l). 
98. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2)(D); see I.R.C. § 179; note 3 supra. 
99. See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1923). 
100. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) ("As in 
all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of 
the purposes Congress sought to serve"); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our 
objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the 
legislative will"). Given the confluence of tax policy and congressional intent in this area, 
subtle distinctions between legislative purpose, intent, and the policies underlying legislation 
are not relevant to the interpretation of the Code sections implicated by distribution of previ-
ously expensed assets. 
101. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980) ("the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent 
a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive."); Arizona v. Maypenny, 608 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) ("clear and 
unequivocal language" is "determinative" of statute's construction). 
102. See Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455,464 (1934): 
The rule that where the statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken literally and given 
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of legislative intent can inform the interpretation of the statutory 
language, 103 and in some cases even override it. 104 Given the pur-
pose of the judicial inquiry, such a result reflects a truer fidelity to 
legislation than does strict literalism, provided that the extrinsic evi-
dence relied on by the court is more probative of congressional in-
tent than the statutory language. While such situations arise 
infrequently, legislative drafting remains an inexact science, whose 
precision and clarity do not approach their apex in the Code. 105 
Even if the Court finds the literal meaning of section 336 inconsistent 
with the evident intent of Congress, the better course would be to 
vindicate the policy judgment of the legislative branch rather than 
statutory wording which fails to reflect it. 
C. Conflict with Section 111 
In addition to doubts regarding the applicability of section 336 to 
"recoveries" of previously expensed assets, a potential conflict exists 
between sections 111 and 336. Section 111 textually refers solely to 
exclusions from income where no prior tax benefi~ has accrued, and 
therefore cannot directly conflict with a nonrecognition provision. 
But section 111 negatively implies that where a recovery has been 
the subject of a prior tax benefit, the amount recovered is includible 
effect according to its language is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships that 
may sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative purpose. . • . But the ex-
pounding of a statutory provision strictly according to the latter without regard to other 
parts of the Act and legislative history would often defeat the object intended to be 
accomplished. 
103. The plain meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule oflaw, and does 
not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." Boston Sand Co. v. United 
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (per Holmes, J.); see Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 7~7, 739 (2d 
Cir.), qffd., 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (per L. Hand, J.) ("it is one of the surest indexes of a mature 
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that 
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympthetic and imaginative 
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."). The vitality of these principles is evident 
from their recent citation in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981). 
104. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,266 (1981) ("The circumstances of the enact-
ment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of 
co=on meaning to have their literal effect"). For examples involving the Code, see Commis-
sioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissentjng) ("Here we have the most 
persuasive kind of evidence that Congress did not mean the language in controversy, however 
plain it may be to the ordinary user of English, to have the ordinary meaning"); Corn Products 
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (broadening the exceptions to § 1221 (§ 
117(a) of the 1939 Code) beyond their literal language); Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 
(1939) (holding that for purposes of casualty losses not connected with trade or business, now 
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), the basis rule, now in§ 165(b), must be modified to account for the decline 
in value while in non-business use). 
105. As Justice Brennan has laconically observed with regard to applying the plain mean-
ing rule to the Code, ''the meaning of the 1954 Code, however, is anything but plain." Fulman 
v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 563 n.7 (1978). Of greater relevance to § 336, Judge Friendly 
has candidly admitted that "[t]he corporate liquidation provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code, with their involuted cross-references, are not for reading by him who runs; to the lay-
man they have no meaning, either plain or fancy. They are for reading by lawyers, and primar-
ily tax lawyers at that." J.C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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as income. This inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule has been 
acknowledged by courts as the basis for overruling other nonrecogni-
tion provisions, and is bolstered by the fact that the congressional 
reports on the 1954 Code describe section 111 as "relating to the 
inclusion of amounts attributable to the recovery of bad debts, 
etc."106 Thus although the specific Code language does not conflict 
directly with section 336, longstanding case authority plus Congress' 
own description of the section indicates a conflict that requires judi-
cial resolution. 
For section 111 to conflict with section 336, the requisite "recov-
ery" to invoke section 111 must exist. The Code does not define "re-
covery," and the Treasury Regulations define the term only by 
illustrations such as "amounts received" or "cancellation of taxes ac-
crued."107 The majority in Tennessee-Carolina suggested three possi-
ble theories of "recovery:" ( a) sale or exchange; (b) end of need; and 
(c) a fictional "recovery" of the assets which were fictionally "con-
sumed" when the expense deduction was allowed. None of these 
theories is analytically satisfying, but the reasons put forward by the 
court to justify them suggest a theory of recovery consistent with the 
policy analysis developed in Part I. This alternative theory includes 
the accession to income resulting from the distribution of previously 
expensed assets within the category of "recoveries," not by analogy 
to the transactional form of familiar types of recovery, but by direct 
appeal to the policies supporting the tax benefit rule. 
If the corporation sold the previously expensed assets immedi-
ately prior to liquidation, the sale would unquestionably represent a 
"recovery."108 Two theories exist for viewing the distribution of the 
assets directly to the shareholders as, in e:ff ect, a sale or exchange. 
First, the Sixth Circuit majority suggested that the distributed assets 
were exchanged for the corporation's stock which, prior to retire-
ment, had a fair market value.109 But irrespective of the market 
value of the stock, it is worth nothing to the corporation. The corpo-
ration can make no use of the stock other than to retire it, and the 
market value of the stock has no effect on a liquidating corporation. 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the portion of the market 
value of the stock allocated to the previously expensed assets would 
106. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A36 (1954); accord S. REP. No. 1622, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1954).; see cases cited in note 14 supra (overriding I.R.C. § 337); Nash v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (refusing to apply the tax benefit rule in the§ 351 context, but 
only because the Court found no "recovery" sufficient to bring the rule into play); note 115 
infra and accompanying text. 
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.lll-l(a)(2) (1956). 
108. In this situation, there is an "amount received," see Treas. Reg.§ 1.111-l(a)(2), supra 
note 107, that was the subject of a prior deduction, see I.R.C. § 1.111-l(a)(l) (1956). The cases 
cited at note 12 supra indicate that I.R.C. § 337 would not provide nonrecognition in the case 
of previously expensed assets. 
109. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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equal their cost. Thus even if the distribution in redemption of stock 
is an exchange, the amount of the previous deduction would not 
measure the amount realized on the expensed assets. 
A second theory for treating a distribution as a sale was provided 
inKimbell-.Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 110 which treated a 
corporation purchasing all of the stock in a second corporation and 
immediately liquidating the newly acquired subsidiary as having 
purchased the assets of the second corporation directly, therefore al-
lowing a stepped-up basis in those assets. 111 The step-up in basis led 
the majority in Tennessee-Carolina to view the assets as if the new 
subsidiary had sold them. 112 However, if the assets were sold, the 
sale was by the shareholders, through the sale of their shares. By 
exercising this choice, the shareholders e.ff ectively liquidated the cor-
poration. Thus the acquired corporation may be viewed as having 
distributed the assets to shareholders who then sold them, 113 but it 
makes no sense to view the corporation as having sold the assets, at 
least as long as the shareholders acted in their private capacities. 114 
Thus the stepped-up basis allowed under the Kimbell-.Diamond rule 
does not justify treatment of a liquidating distribution of assets as, in 
effect, a sale. 
An alternative recovery argument in Tennessee-Carolina involves 
the "end of need" argument, borrowed from a series of cases con-
cerning bad debt reserves, that culminated with Nash v. United 
States. 115 In these cases, the taxpayer .took a deduction for a bad 
110. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), qffd. per curium, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 
{1951). 
Ill. See note 61 supra. 
112. 582 F.2d at 382. 
113. The separate identities of the corporation and shareholders preclude collapsing these 
two steps into a single step even under the step transaction doctrine. Ignoring the separate 
identities would undermine the assignment of income arguments made at note 39 supra, but 
perhaps not fatally, since one could argue that income of shareholders as shareholders should 
not be shifted to the same people as individuals. 
114. Although a contrary result might be reached if the officer/shareholders act in their 
corporate capacities, the congressional intent embodied in § 337 is in effect a presumption that 
the actions of shareholders in the liquidating setting are in their personal, rather than corpo• 
rate, capacities. See note 14supra. A different rule for shareholders acting in their corporate 
capacities (particularly for closely held corporations) would resurrect the problems that § 337 
was intended to resolve. However, it is acknowledged that§ 337 has not eliminated•all diffi-
culties that tum on the capacity in which an officer/shareholder acts. See, e.g., B. BtTIKER & 
J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, at ~~ 11.63, 11.68, 11.69 (indicating that the issue of capacity is 
raised in non-liquidating distributions and liquidating distributions which fail to meet the for-
mal requirements of§ 337). 
115. 398 U.S. I (1970). Nash is not as favorable to either side in Tennessee-Carolina as the 
authors of the opinions imply. See 65 T.C. at 449, 451. The issue in Nash was whether a 
transfer of accounts receivable to a corporation qualified for nonrecognition under I.R.C. 
§ 351 when the transferor had taken a deduction for a bad debt reserve. The Service claimed 
that the end ofneed for the bad debt reserve was a recovery taxable under I.R.C. § 111. As the 
dissent pointed out in Tennessee-Carolina, Nash rejected the "end of need" as an event requir-
ing taxation of the previous debt reserve deduction. 398 U.S. at 4. But the Nash Court did not 
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debt reserve, against which actual bad debts were debited when re-
ceivables became uncollectable.116 The balance of the bad debt re-
serve is treated as income once it is no longer needed. But in each 
case, the amount taxed was limited to the amount of the reserve not 
actually used, and in each case the courts taxed only amounts viewed 
as actually having been recovered.117 The bad debt reserve, unlike 
the expense deduction, is specifically authorized as an exception to 
the annual accounting principle to allow a provisional deduction 
which will be reevaluated to reflect later events.118 Thus although 
the end-of-need rationale might add to the policy arguments favor-
ing liquidation as an appropriate time of realization, the cases that 
have developed this doctrine do not provide explicit authority for a 
judicial imposition of the tax benefit rule without some identifiable 
current gain. The Court in Nash seems to imply that the nonrecog-
nition provided by section 351 would have been overriden if there 
had been an actual recovery, but it clearly rejected "end of need" 
without more as a form of "recovery."119 
The final theory of recovery advanced by the majority in Tennes-
see-Carolina treats the assets as constructively consumed at the time 
of the expense deduction. 120 The existence of the assets at the time 
of liquidation amounts to the "receipt" of equivalent new assets. Al-
hold that where the end of need is accompanied by an actual recovery, the amount recovered 
is taxable notwithstanding the nonrecognition provision of§ 35 I, although the Court seems to 
have assumed that it would be. See note 119 i,!fra. In effect, the Court found that the need for 
• the debt reserve had not terminated, but instead became a reality rather than a prediction 
when the receivables were transferred at their net (rather than face) value. The majority in 
Tennessee-Carolina infers from Nash that if the net market value of the receivables had ex-
ceeded their face value less the debt reserve, the excess would be taxable. 65 T.C. at 449. The 
dissent insists that the inference only follows if there is some exchange providing the transferor 
of the receivables with a receipt of cash or the discharge of a liability. Nash does not specify 
what sort of "recovery" must accompany the "end of need" to impose tax liability, and this is 
the crucial issue separating the majority and minority views of the case. 
116. Alternatively, debts would be deducted as they became worthless. I.R.C. § 166(a). 
See I.R.C. § 166(c). 
117. See, e.g., Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 
1972); Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1966); West Seattle 
Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. First State Bank 
of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004, 1005 (5th Cir. 1948); Citizens Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. of Cleve-
land v. United States, 290 F.2d 932,937 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Where an actual recovery has occurred 
(or has been assumed) the courts have not hesitated to except the recovery from nonrecgnition 
provisions on tax benefit grounds: 
This is not a case of the appreciation of an asset realized at the time of sale. Rather the 
sale of the asset has freed a particular charge against capital which, having been derived 
from income, must be returned to income. Such a determination does not do violence to 
the meaning or purpose of section 337. 
Citizens Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. of Cleveland v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 936 (ct. cl. 
1961). 
118. I.R.C. § 166(c); Treas. Reg.§ 1.166-4, T.D.-6403, 1959-2 C.B. 77. 
119. 398 U.S. at 4-5. This dicta supports the view that the negative inference of section 111 
can indeed override nonrecognition provisions. 
120. 582 F.2d at 382; 65 T.C. at 447. 
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though this approach resembles in its effect the theoretical argument 
advanced in Part I of this Note, as the Tennessee-Carolina dissenters 
correctly pointed out, the tax laws should be concerned with actual, 
not fictional, gain. 121 Nevertheless, the similar argument in Part I, 
based on actual, rather than constructive, recovery at the time of liq-
uidation will in most cases accomplish the result sought by the Ten-
nessee-Carolina majority. 122 
An alternative theory of "recovery" can be advanced which, 
while similar to the arguments made by the court in Tennessee-Caro-
lina, is more in keeping with the Code and prior case authority. The 
Code clearly provides that dispositions of assets other than sales or 
exchanges can represent current income.123 Section 1245, which is, 
in effect, an inclusionary tax benefit rule for "recovery" of deprecia-
tion expenses, 124 indicates that any disposition of assets can be a "re-
covery'' where the assets embody an element of unrecognized gain 
not attributable to appreciation.125 Section 1245 explicitly authorizes 
review of past depreciation deductions to detect that element of un-
realized gain. Although section 1245 does not apply to expensed 
items, 126 no such express authorization is required, because the ex-
amination of past tax consequences to determine the character of 
121. 582 F.2d at 385; 65 T.C. at 450. 
122. See note 129 i'!fra. 
123. That is, although gains under I.R.C. § IOOl{b) include only money and property re-
ceived (extended by Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980) to include discharge of liabilities), other 
types of gains have been recognized upon disposition of the property. In addition to the rela-
tively recent recapture provisions, see note 124 infra, gains on property dispositions involving 
no receipt of property or discharge of any liability of the transferor have long been recognized 
under the doctrine of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947) (upon disposition of property 
subject to nomecourse debt, amount realized includes amount of debt). Crane itself was lim-
ited to situations where the nomecourse debt was less than the value of the property, 331 U.S. 
at 14 n.37, and may therefore be explainable on the basis that the debtor would treat the debt 
as if he were personally liable. But other courts have applied Crane where the property is 
worthless, see Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 
(1978), and it could not have been argued that the transferor is relieved of any personal liabil-
ity. The result in Millar is justifiable on the same grounds as the result in United States v. 
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931), discussed at note 27 supra: the taxpayer was excused 
from taxation on the loan proceeds because of the presumed need to pay the loan back (despite 
the lack of personal liability). When repayment is no longer a real possibility, it is appropriate 
to tax the original receipt of the loan proceeds. But see Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no economic benefit at the time of disposition of worthless 
property subject to nomecourse debt). 
124. 1.R.C. § 1245. See O'Hare, supra note 6, at 216. The regulations ·under § 111 had 
specifically excluded recovery of depreciation from the application of the statutory tax benefit 
rule, thus requiring a specific provision. See '.freas. Reg. § I.I II-l(a) (1956). 
125. According to Professor Kahn's argument, even the excess of the fair market value of 
the asset over the depreciated basis, as opposed to the original cost, represents a form of appre• 
ciation. See note 93 supra. But it is clear that Congress views only the excess over original cost 
as appreciation. The rest of the excess over depreciated basis is viewed as a recovery of ordi-
nary income, to the extent it offsets against ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2). 
126. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3), 263(a)(2); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 
528 (Ct.CL 1973) (holding that expensed assets are not § 48 property, and are consequently 
§ 1245 property); Reveley & Pratt, supra note 6 at 419, arguing that§ 1245 should provide an 
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current transactions is precisely the function of section 111. Part I 
has argued that, by analogy to Kirby Lumber, the end of the expecta-
tion of consuming previously expensed assets in a trade or business 
constitutes an event of realization of gain to the corporation. 127 The 
Code's definition of income128 is broad enough to encompass this 
gain, and the definition of "recovery" in the Treasury Regulations, 
including as it does cancellation of tax liability, is clearly not limited 
to actual receipts of cash. Given the example of section 1245's will-
ingness to impose tax to correct for excessive deductions, an expan-
sive interpretation of "recovery" is certainly justified as a means of 
serving the same purpose.129 This approach does no more than rec-
ognize that the policies underlying the tax benefit rule apply to previ-
ously expensed assets distributed in liquidation, and that the 
statutory expression of those policies permits their judicial vindica-
tion in this situation. 
CONCLUSION 
There is an element of gain inherent in assets which have been 
expensed, but not yet consumed. The time_ of liquidation is an ap-
propriate time to recognize this gain. Notwithstanding the annual 
accounting principle, the tax benefit rule in its traditional form per-
mits examination of past tax treatment of the assets to determine the 
amount of this element of gain at the time ofrealization. Neither the 
analogy for recapturing prior expensed deductions under tax benefit principles. See also note 
75 supra. 
127. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. 
128. I.R.C. § 61(a). 
129. The "inconsistent event" test proposed in Tennessee-Carolina is a broader rejection of 
annual accounting principles than the proposed approach, which requires a "recovery" but 
uses the rationale in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), to find a recovery 
based on past deferral of realization. The situations in which the distinction is relevant may be 
rare. Consider as a possibility the situation in Hillsboro Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 
529 (7th Cir. 1981) and First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F.2d 
I 142 (7th Cir. 1980). In these cases, a bank paid a tax levied by the state on the shareholders 
based on the value of their shares. The payment of this tax by the bank was deductible under 
I.R.C. § 164(e). When the state tax was found unconstitutional, the tax was refunded to the 
shareholders. J.Jnder the "inconsistent event" test, adopted by the Seventh Circuit, the result is 
easy: the deduction presumed a tax; there was ultimately no tax; the bank must make good for 
the past deduction, despite annual accounting principles. 
Under the more restrictive test proposed here, the result is more problematic. At the time 
of the deduction, the bank had incurred an expense and deducted it, just as in the case of 
expensed assets. But unlike the situation in Kirby Lumber, in which there was the untaxed 
receipt of loan proceeds, or the case of expensed assets, in which there is the untaxed accumu-
lation of assets, the bank took in no unrealized gain. At the time the tax was refunded, it was 
paid to the shareholder. Although it may be reasonable to attribute the shareholders' benefit 
to the corporation, see note 43 supra and accompanying text, this approach would raise ques-
tions about whether the bank should be taxed on involuntary payments to shareholders, 
whether intent to pay the tax should be interpreted as intent to pay a dividend, and why 
Congress chose to allow deductions by the corporation of "dividends" used to pay taxes but 
not direct payments to shareholders. Because of reliance on the "inconsistent event" test, these 
issues were not examined in Hillsboro or Taylorville. 
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general policies of nonrecognition nor the Code's specific applica-
tions to liquidating corporations favor nonrecognition of this ele-
ment of gain, except possibly in the case of a liquidation of a 
subsidiary to whi~h the section 334(b )(1) carryover basis applies. 130 
Finally, section 336 is not a bar to recognizing gains which are the 
result of accounting methods rather than actual asset appreciation. 
The mechanical application of section 336 would ignore the pur-
poses behind that provision as well as section 111, and would run 
counter to the policy embodied in other parts of the Code against 
permitting similar gains to escape taxation. The rule advocated here 
comports with the basic concept of a tax on net income, prevents 
unwarranted transfer of tax liability out of the corporate system, and 
is consistent with the policy of nonrecognition as a means of avoid-
ing both artificial tax barriers and tax incentives to changes in enter-
prise form. 
130. In that situation, there is no transfer of income out of the corporate system, see notes 
39 & 61 supra, and the parent and subsidiary may reasonably be viewed as a single taxpaying 
entity, see notes 72 & 74 supra. In addition, the analogy to § 1245 in this situation favors 
nomecognition. See I.R.C. §§ 1245{b)(3), 336(b)(2) (exceptions to depreciation and LIFO re-
capture where transferee takes transferor's basis). Deferral in this instance would be consistent 
with the purpose behind § 332 to avoid deterring simplification of corporate structure. See B. 
BIITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, at ~ I 1.40. 
